Incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption of water quality protection practices by Cooper, Joseph C. & Keim, Russ
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Incentive payments to encourage farmer
adoption of water quality protection
practices
Joseph C. Cooper and Russ Keim
Economic Research Service, USDA
February 1996
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24779/
MPRA Paper No. 24779, posted 10. September 2010 15:56 UTC
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Incentive payments to encourage farmer adoption of  
 water quality protection practices 
 
 
 by 
 
 Joseph C. Cooper* 
 Russ W. Keim 
 
 October 27, 1995 
 
 
 
 
*The authors are with the Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1301 
New York Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20005. The views expressed herein are the authors' and 
do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
 
 
 
 
 Incentive Payments to Encourage Farmer Adoption of  
 Water Quality Protection Practices 
 
 
 
 Incentive Payments to Encourage Farmer Adoption of  
 Water Quality Protection Practices 
 
Abstract 
Farmers can be encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management 
practices through the use of incentive payments.  This paper uses both a bivariate probit 
with sample selection model and a double hurdle model on data from a survey of farmers to 
predict farmer adoption of the practices as a function of the payment offer.  The five 
management practices addressed here are integrated pest management, legume crediting, 
manure testing, split applications of nitrogen, and soil moisture testing.  Also estimated 
are models that predict the acreage on which these practices would be applied given the 
decision to accept the incentive payments estimated.   
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strategies to protect groundwater that we will examine in this paper are generally profitable 
In response to increasing public concern over the contribution of agricultural pollutants to 
the degradation of surface and ground water supplies, the 1990 Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation and Trade Act (FACTA) authorized the USDA to initiate the Water Quality 
Incentive Program (WQIP). WQIP is administered by the Natural Resources Conservation 
Service (NRCS) through the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP).  Its goal is to 
mitigate the negative impacts of agricultural activities on ground and surface water 
supplies through the use of stewardship payments and technical assistance to farmers who 
agree to implement approved practices.  With these incentives, farmers are encouraged to 
experiment with more environmentally benign production practices than they otherwise 
would use.  In 1992 and 1993, the funding levels for WQIP were $6.75 million and $15 
million, respectively.  Currently, farmers in only a small number of watersheds are 
eligible to enter the program.  However, the issue has been raised (e.g., Sinner) of making 
this type of incentive payment program more widely available. 
 WQIP incentive payments are not determined through market interaction.  
Instead, the payments are essentially a fixed offer amount.  As a result, a function 
modeling the probability of adoption of a practice as a function of the incentive payment 
cannot be estimated from current market data.  Using the results of a survey of farmers, 
our goal is to model the probability of adopting a preferred farming practice as a function 
of the incentive payments.  This response function would be useful in comparing the 
benefits and costs of encouraging farmers to try the various preferred management 
practices.  In conjunction with this goal, our secondary goal is to model how many acres 
the farmer will devote to the new practice, given the decision to adopt. 
 The USDA believes that the five agri-chemical management and production 
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assessment using the contingent valuation method (CVM) suggesting that all CVM studies 
for the farmer.  Yet, even though their implementation should theoretically boost 
profitability, not all farmers who could adopt these practices have done so.  One re
may be that the farmer is risk averse: even if the alternative practice might appear 
profitable on paper, the farmer may be unwilling to adopt the practice unless the fa
sees neighboring farmers adopting it.  Another reason for not adopting the practice migh
be that the farmer either has no information, or lacks sufficient information, on the 
alternative practice.  Hence, an empirical comparison of profits or costs under the o
the new practices will not provide enough information to determine the necessary incentive 
payment to encourage adoption.  To avoid these problems associated with estimating 
minimum willingness to accept (WTA) to change practices as the difference in cost or 
profit between the two states, one can use a direct revelation technique for assessing the
probability of farmer adoption at various incentive payment levels.  
 
E
While the researcher could directly elicit from the current nonadopting 
minimum WTA necessary to adopt the practice, a dichotomous choice (DC) approach is 
likely to be preferable.  Under this approach, the respondent is prompted to provide a 
"Yes" or "No" response to a dollar bid amount contained in the valuation question, whe
the bid amount is varied across the respondents.  This method is particularly likely to 
reveal accurate statements of value as the format provides reasonable incentives for val
formulation and reliable value statement (Hoehn and Randall).1  In fact, the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Blue Ribbon Panel's (co-chaired by Kenneth
Arrow and Richard Solow) proposed guidelines for conducting natural resource damage
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≤ $C} = Pr{V0 + ε0 ≤ V1 + ε1} = Pr{ε0 - ε1 ≤ V1 - V0}, where V1 - V0 = γ + αC, and where 
should use the DC format (U.S. Department of Commerce).  With the DC approach, 
instead of trying to identify the farmer's profit function (which would not include any 
profit-independent reasons to accept the program), we simply need to determine whethe
not the farmer's minimum WTA is less than or equal to the offered payment incentive.
 The farmer's decision process is modeled using the random utility model approach. 
From the utility theoretic standpoint, a farmer is willing to accept $C to switch to a new 
production practice if the farmer's utility with the new practice and incentive payment is at 
least as great as at the initial state; i.e., if U(0,y;x) ≤ U(1,y + C;x), where 0 is the base state
1 is the state with the WQIP practice, y is farmer i's income, and x is a vector of other 
attributes of the farmer that may affect the WTA decision. C can be written as C* + δ, 
where δ is state 0 pecuniary costs less state 1 pecuniary costs, and where C* is the 
government's incentive payment.  Hence, C can be considered a 'net' incentive paymen
Note that δ can be positive; due to some nonpecuniary costs, a farmer may not have
switched to the preferred practice even if δ is positive.  The farmer's utility function 
U(i,y;s) is unknown because some components are unobservable to the researcher, an
thus, can be considered a random variable from the researcher's standpoint.  The 
observable portion is V(i,y;x), the mean of the random variable U.  With the addition of a
error εi, where εi is an independently and identically distributed random variable w
mean, the farmer's decision to accept $C can be re-expressed as  
(1) V(0,y;x) + ε0 ≤ V(1,y + C;x) + ε1.   
If V(i,y;x) = γi + αy, where α > 0, for i = 0,1, then the farmer is wi
change if γ0 + αy + ε0 ≤ γ1 + α(y+C) + ε1. 
 The decision to accept $C can be expressed in a probability framework as Pr{WTA 
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where equation (2) is the adoption equation discussed in the previous section, y1i = 1 if 
γ =γ1 - γ0.   Because V1 - V0 = γ + αC is g
above, it is compatible with the theory of utility maximization.  The probabilities of 
participation in the program for a schedule of incentive payments simply can be obtained 
through  Pi = Fε(Δi).2  Because rates of adoption at a particular incentive payment value 
may vary among the practices, the optimal rate of adoption may not be the same across
practices from a cost effectiveness standpoint. 
 
Estimation of Minimum WTA and Level of WQIP Enrollment. 
Traditionally, univariate probit or logit is used t
d
respondents as only those respondents who do not currently use the p
were asked the DC questions.  Regressing the DC data without accounting for the 
nonrandom selection of this data from the survey data set can produce biased and 
inefficient coefficient estimates (Boyes, Hoffman, and Low).  For the survey, a sample
selection question was used to identify respondents who do not currently (in 1992) u
practice.  Next, respondents who said that they did not currently use the practice w
asked the WTA question.  Formally, denoting the 0/1 response to the sample selection 
question as y2i and denoting the 0/1 response to the adoption question as y1i, y1i is observed 
only when y2i = 0.  In other words, the disturbances are correlated between the two 
questions.  The system of equations is presented in utility difference form as:   
(2) ΔV1i = x1i'γ1 + αCi = ε1i where y1i = 1 if ΔV1i ≤ ε1i, y1i = 0, otherwise,   
(3) ΔV2i = x2i'γ2 = ε2i where y2i = 1 if ΔV2i ≤ ε2i, y2i = 0, otherwise 
 (ε1i,ε2i) ~ bivariate normal (0,0,1,1,ρ),     
 
 
 
er  - x11i'γ1, 
 ε ormat as (2), 
u ing a bivariate normal relationship 
coefficient between the two equations.  Because the 
than would a univariate 
rs efficiency 
ur if 
 
 
where Φa is the bivariate normal probability density function and Φ is the normal 
farm i's true WTA is greater than the bid offer, ΔV1i = V0i - V1i, xi1'γ  = x01i'γ0
ε1i = 11i - ε01i, and C is the incentive payment offer.  Using the same f
equation (3) is the sample selection equation.  Ass m
for ε1i and ε2i, bivariate probit is used to estimate the two sets of coefficients.  The 
bivariate probit with sample selection log-likelihood function for the situation where y1i is 
observed only when yi2 = 0 is: 
(4) lnL(γ1,γ2,ρ12)  =  ∑y2i=0,y1i=1 lnΦa[x1i′γ1,-x2i′γ2,-ρ12] 
  +  ∑y2i=0,y1i=0 lnΦa[-x1i′γ1,-x2i′γ2,ρ12]  +  ∑y2i=1 lnΦ[x2i′γ2], 
where C is included in X1 for notational simplicity, Φ is the normal CDF, Φa is the bivariate 
CDF, and ρ12 is the correlation 
likelihood function in equation (4) contains more information 
probit likelihood function for equation (2), maximization of equation (4) offe
gains over univariate probit.  Furthermore, equation (4) accounts for potential correlation 
between (2) and (3) and therefore corrects for the sample selection bias that could occ
(2) were to be estimated singly (Boyes, Hoffman, and Low).  The disadvantages of the
bivariate log-likelihood function in equation (4) are that convergence of the estimates is not 
always easily achieved and estimated covariance matrices are frequently singular.  Note 
that if estimated ρ12 = 0, then the farmers who answer the WTA question can be assumed to 
be randomly drawn from the sample and equation (3) can be ignored.  Equation (2) can 
then be estimated using probit. 
 Applying the definition of conditional probability, the farmer response function for
the bivariate probit case is as follows: 
(5) Prob( WTAi ≥ bidi | y2i = 0) = Φa(x1i'γ1, -x2i'γ2, ρ)/Φ(-x2i'γ2), 
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inary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (6) on farmers 
ion, 
the sample for equation (6) is not drawn randomly from the population who answered the 
probability density function.  P
whether or not the farmer believes the practice will affect farm profitability, soil type, type 
of crop(s) planted, farm size, amount o
level of environmental awareness and concern.  Except for the b
priori reason why both equations should not use the same explanatory variables.  
However, even if the variables in the two equations are the same, the estimated coeffic
are not necessarily similar.  Because observations for those farmers who currently use the 
practice are analyzed in the regression, additional information is added to the estimation 
equation 2 if it is estimated simultaneously with equation 3. 
 As stated earlier, estimating the probit or bivariate probit with the sample s
model is the first step of our research agenda. In addition to developing the farmer 
participation equation as a function of the offer amount, we would also like to know how 
many acres the farmer will enroll given, the decision to participate.3  The number of acres 
enrolled in the preferred practice by farmer i can be stated as
(6) PACRESi = zi'θ + ui, 
where PACRESi is the amount of acres in the preferred practice, zi is a vector of 
explanatory variables, and ui is a random disturbance with mean zero.  Explanatory 
variables can include the payment offer, length of participation in the program, total 
acreage, erosion potential, farm income, and amount of off-far
 Unfortunately, ord
who do not currently use the preferred practice, but agree to do so with the incentive 
payment, have the potential for serious bias.  Because these hypothetical acreage 
enrollments are only observed for the farmers who answered "Yes" to the WTA quest
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∂λ2i/∂Bid are less than zero.4  
 the regression of PACRESi on zi, λ1, and λ2 
 (Tunali).    
riate probit sample 
ES, which cannot be less 
than zero.  Tobit regression is commonly applied to models where the dependent variable 
survey, implying omitted variable bias.  Furthermore, additional bias m
only those answering "No" to the sample selection question were asked the WTA question.
In addition to being potentially biased, OLS estimation of equation (6) is inefficient 
(Greene, 1990).  Equation (6) can be corrected by considering the responses to the
qualitative dependent variable questions in the analysis of equation (6).   
   In this paper, an extension of the Heckman procedure to three equations is used for 
estimation (Tunali; Greene, 1992) when ρ is statistically different from zero.  Since 
PACRESi is observed only when y1i = 1 and y2i = 0,  the revised version of equation (6) is: 
(7) E[PACRESi | zi, in sample] =   
   =  E[PACRESi | zi, y1i = 1, y2i = 0 ] 
   =  E[PACRESi | zi, ε1i ≥ ΔV1i, ε2i < ΔV2i  ] 
   =  zi'θ + E[ui | ε1i ≥ x1i'γ1 + αCi, ε2i < x2i'γ2] 
Tunali shows that equation (7) reduces to:  
(8) PACRESi =  zi'θ + λ1iτ1 + λ2iτ2 + ηi, 
where ηi is a disturbance term. λ1i a
(9)  λ1i = φ(-x1i'γ1)Φ[(-x2i'γ2 - ρ12y1i)/(1 - ρ122)½]
  λ2i = φ(-x2i'γ2)Φ[(-x1i'γ1 - ρ12y2i)/(1 - ρ122)½]/Φa, 
where x1 = [x1, C] and β1 = [γ, α] and where Φa = bivariate normal C
Φ(x1'β1,-x2'β2,-ρ12).  The derivatives ∂λ1i/∂Bid and 
Consistency of the coefficient estimates from
follows from the consistency of the estimates of λ1 and λ2
 A potential drawback of this selectivity model with biva
selection is that it does not address the censored nature of PACR
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potential for serious bias in the coefficient estimates.  Multiplying the data by the weights 
is censored.  The tobit application in a sample selection framework is the d
Cragg, model (Cragg; Lee and Maddala; Blaylock and Blisard; Gould; Yen).  To res
the selectivity model with bivariate probit sample selection with a tobit structure for the 
continuous portion would require a trivariate normal distribution to tie to
equations; i.e., the joint probability Pi(y2i = 0, y1i = 1, pacresi > 0) would have to be 
calculated.  Because trivariate models are extremely difficult to estimate, for practical 
purposes, the sample selection equation (3) needs to be dropped in order to use the double 
hurdle specification.  As a result, some of the gains in consistency associated with using 
the tobit model with the censored data over OLS must be traded-off against some possible 
loss consistency in giving up the first sample selection stage.  In the double hurdle model
equations (2) and (6) are estimated jointly.  Assuming that ui is distributed N(0,σ2) and 
corr(ui,ε1i) = ρ, the double hurdle log-likelihood function for the situation where PAC
is observed only when yi1 = 0 is (Greene, 1992): 
(10) lnL(γ1,θ,ρ)  =  ∑y1i=0 lnΦ[-x1i′γ1]  + ∑y1i=1,pacresi=0 lnΦa[-zi′θ,x1i′γ1,-ρ] 
  + ∑y1i=1,pacresi>0 {-0.5[ln2π + lnσ + (ui/σ)2] + lnPi} 
where ui = PACRESi - zi′θ, τi = x1i′γ1 + ρui/σ, and Pi = Φ[τi/(1 - ρ2)1/2].  As with the 
bivariate model, interaction between the two equations is carried on through ρ.  Note that 
since the data set does not contain cases where yi1 = 1 and PACRESi = 0, the middle term o
the log-likelihood function drops out and the log-likelihood model reduces to the standard 
tobit model.5 
 Because the survey sampled some regions at higher rates than others (e.g.,
noncropland areas were sampled at lower rates than cropland
by sampling weights.  Not accounting for this exogenous stratified sampling presents t
 
 
 
ghts across the observations is the sample size (Greene, 1992).  Performing 
very 
y 
 practices in each of four critical watershed regions:  the Eastern Iowa and Illinois 
asin areas, the Albermarle-Pamlico Drainage Area covering Virginia and North Carolina, 
 Coastal Plain and the Upper Snake River Basin Area.  These study 
nd erosion 
llage.   
well as their willingness to adopt these practices if they do not currently use the practice 
gives greater weight to observations that have a lower probability of being selected and less 
weight to observations with a higher probability of being selected.  For estimation, the 
weights are multiplied by the sample size and divided by the sum of the weights so that the 
sum of the wei
weighted estimation without scaling the weight variable in this manner can result in 
low standard errors, and thus, very high t-statistics for the estimated coefficients (Greene, 
1992).  
 
Data Description 
The 1992 Area Studies project is a data collection and modeling effort undertaken jointl
by NRCS (formerly SCS), the Economic Research Service (ERS), the U.S. Geological 
Survey (USGS), and the National Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS).  For 1992, data 
on cropping and tillage practices and input management were obtained from 
comprehensive field and farm level surveys of about 1,000 farmers apiece for 1992 
cropping
B
the Georgia-Florida
areas were selected from within the set of U.S. Geological Survey's National Water Quality 
Assessment (NAWQA) sites, and sample sites were chosen to correspond to NRCS's 
National Resource Inventory (NRI) so that information on the physical characteristics 
corresponding to farming activities would be available.  For example, slope a
potential of the soil are likely factors influencing the decision to adopt conservation ti
 Information about the extent of the farmers' current use of the preferred practices as 
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Tables 3 and 4 present the weighted bivariate probit results for the willingness to adopt 
were provided by a supplemental questionnaire.  Respondents to the comprehensive 
questionnaire were asked to complete and mail in this additional section.  For the final 
analysis, 1,261 observations were available.  No participants in existing WQIP programs 
were found among the survey respondents. The practices analyzed here, a short descrip
(as provided in the survey, excluding the sentences on the incentive payment levels) of
each, and the current incentive payment levels are presented in table 1. 
 All of these practices are currently being supported by WQIP.  For the willingness 
to adopt question for all of the practices, the bids offered are $2, $4, $7, $10, $15, and $20. 
The bid ranges were chosen to cover what we perceived to be the likely range of WTA.  
The bids were randomly assigned with equal probability to the surveys.6  The specific
CVM question asked to the farmer is, "If you don't use this practice [listed in the question
currently, would you adopt the practice if you were given a $[X] payment per acre?" 
(answer "Yes" or "No").  The sample selection equation is "Is this practice [listed in the 
survey] currently in use on your farm?" (answer 'Yes' or 'No' ).  A copy of the survey is
available from the authors. 
 Explanatory variables are defined in table 2.  The decision on which variables to 
include in the regressions for each of the practices was based on whether or not the 
variables appear justified from a farm management standpoint.  For instance, SNT is not 
included in the regressions for IPM as the former should have little to do with the latter.  
Table 2 also presents sample statistics for these variables for current nonusers of the 
practice.7   
 
Estimation Results 
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regards to the other coefficients, in table 3, the key variable, BID, is of the 
orrect sign and is significant to at least the 1% level for four of the practices and is 
level for one of the other practices.  In general, explanatory power 
e 
 bivariate probit 
mple e 
ing 
 
ory 
practices.  It is negative and insignificant for SMTST.  However, the net impact of 
question and the sample sele
c ly uses the practice), respectively.8  For bivariate normal densities (though not 
necessarily for other densities), a value for ρ12 of zero would imply that the two equ
are independent.  If significant, a negative correlation is expected as y1 can equal 1 only if
y2 = 0.  Of the five practices, the correlation coefficient between the two equations (ρ) is 
significantly different from 0 at the 1% level for three of the practices.   
 With 
c
significant at the 5% 
among the other variables was lower, as would be expected.  For several practices, 
BPWORK was significant and had a negative sign, suggesting that the greater the amount 
of off-farm work the primary operator performs, the less likely the farmer is to adopt th
practices.  Some variables that were significant for current users of the practices were not 
significant for current non-users, and vice versa. 
 Incorporating the information from the regression results presented in tables 3 and 
4, table 5 presents the final, continuous stage of the selectivity model with
sa  selection regression results.  Using the coefficient results from tables 3 and 4, th
λ1 and λ2 variables were calculated as defined in equation (9) in the Gauss programm
language.  Then, for farmers who do not currently use the practices but say they will at the
posted offer amounts, PACRES was regressed on λ1, λ2, and the rest of the explanat
variables.  As table 5 shows, the coefficients on λ1 and λ2 are significant for all the 
applicable practices.  Generally, the R2's are quite good for cross-sectional regressions.  
The coefficient on the BIDVAL is significant and has a correct sign for four of the five 
 
 
 
 when the impact of BIDVAL through λ1 
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mple selection approach appears to be preferable to the 
n 
 the 
provided that they are given sufficient information on the practice.  However, the figure 
BIDVAL on acres enrolled for SMTST is positive
a is included.  Among the other regressors, TACRE, BPWORK, and NETINC were 
significant to at least the 5% level for the all the continuous portions of the bivariate probit 
sample selection regressions. 
 Tables 6 and 7 present the tobit double hurdle results, with the former presenting 
the probit portion (see "Obs" in tables 3 and 4 for sample sizes) and the latter the 
continuous portion.  Presented at the bottom of table 7 is the bias of the predicted value o
the dependent variable with respect to the actual value, as well as the mean square er
(MSE) of the predicted value.  Noting that the equations in table 7 and in table 5 are 
nested, the MSE values can be compared between the two models.  The results show tha
except for LEGCR, the MSE for the continuous portion of the double hurdle model is
lower than that for the bivariate probit sample selection model.  However, for all double 
hurdle regressions, the bias is unacceptably high when compared to those from the 
bivariate model.9  Hence, if the researcher's goal is to predict enrollment, the selectivity 
model with bivariate probit sa
double hurdle approach.10  
 
Model Applications 
Applying the bivariate probit coefficients results to the conditional probability equation i
equation (5), figure 1 presents graphs of the relationship between the offer amount and
probability of acceptance for those farmers who do not currently use the practices.  The 
positive adoption rates ranging from 12-20% at $0 suggests that some current non-users 
may be willing to adopt the practice without an incentive payment (as do current users), 
 
 
 
ctices 
 
rent 
0 incentive payment for farmers in the survey range from a 
w of 7.9% for MANTST to a high of 45% for SPLTN.11  
ws, the payments needed to encourage 50% of current non-users to 
 
 as a function of the payment 
ffer.  
ive payments are also estimated.  
hese results can be used in a cost-benefit analysis to best decide how to allocate the 
program budget among the preferred production practices. 
also shows that only around an additional 10 % of current nonusers will adopt the pra
if they are offered the current WQIP payments of around $10/acre.  Hence, it is expensive
to get current nonadopters of the practices described earlier to adopt the practice.  Cur
use rates of the practices at $
lo
 As figure 1 sho
adopt are much higher than the current payments levels.  Increasing payments to promote 
100% adoption by current non-users would be costly.  Given this, a cost-efficiency or 
cost-benefit analysis could be used to determine what participation rates, and hence, what
offer amounts would be desirable for each practice.    
 
Conclusion 
Farmers can be encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management 
practices through the use of incentive payments.  Current USDA practice is to offer a 
fixed "take it or leave it" payment per acre to those not currently using the desired 
practices.  Hence, there is insufficient observed data to model the probability of farmer 
adoption of the environmentally sound management practices
o Without this function, one does not know at what level to set incentive payments to 
achieve desired levels of participation.  This paper uses a direct revelation technique 
based on a random utility model to develop and estimate models predicting farmer 
adoption of the practices as a function of the payment offer.  Models that predict the 
acreage enrolled given the decision to accept the incent
T
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their valuable assistance. 
1. While willingness to pay (WTP) questions are considered to be incentive compatible in 
the referendum format, some capacity for strategic response bias (in both the upper and 
lower directions) may still exist with WTA questions.  However, the referendum format 
most likely diminishes this bias over the open-ended question format. 
2. Hanemann (1984; 1989) provides formulas for estimating mean WTA. 
3. As any government program would reserve the right (as the WQIP program does) to 
admit only the acreage it deems most critical for controlling water quality, the modeling of 
this supply response function does not imply that the farmer will be able to enroll all the 
acreage he desires into the program.  However, the acreage supply response functions are 
important to the agency by giving some indication of the upper bound on the total cash 
payments the agency would have to make at each incentive level. 
4. For estimation, it was found that convergence of the bivariate model was more easily 
achieved if the selection equation (equation 3) was set up such that y2i is reversed, i.e. such 
that y2i = 0 if the farmer current uses the practice and y2i = 1, otherwise.  In this case, the 
bivariate probit CDF is Φa(-x1'β1,-x2'β2,ρ12) and  ∂λ1i/∂Bid > 0 and ∂λ2i/∂Bid < 0. 
5. Conditional mean prediction of PACRESi (Maddala; Greene, 1992) of a bivariate 
standard normal distribution is:  
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s the practice. Hence, one can reverse the coefficient signs in 
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e 
results are available from the authors. 
E[ pacresi | 
ρ(-zi′θ) + ρφ(x1i′γ)Φ[δ(zi′θ - ρ(x1i′γ))]},  where δ = -1/(1 - ρ2)1/2 . 
6. The survey procedures in place did not allow a more complex allocation of bids.  See
Cooper and Kanninen for other possible surveys designs. 
7. Sample statistics for all farmers and by practice are available from the authors. 
8. As stated in note 4, the sample selection portion (equation 3) was estimated with y2i = 0 
if the farmer currently use
table 4 to make them comparable to those in table 3.  In deference to tradition, the 
convention that y2i equals 1 for users is maintained in the text. 
9. By practice, in the order presented in the tables, the mean stated level of acres enrolled 
per farm are 415, 616, 326, 284, and 583, respectively. 
10.  In this paper, we used sample selection approaches to select out the n
practices for the purpose of estimating minimum WTA.  However, even though we did
not ask current users of the practice a valuation question, we know that they are willing to 
accept a $0 incentive payment per acre to use the practice.  Hence, as an anonymous 
reviewer noted, if users and non-users have the same preference structure, then they can be 
combined together in the qualitative variable regression for determining minimum WTA
thereby adding more information to the model than if only hypothe
for their minimum WTA.  We tried this approach with a multiple bound model along the
lines of than in Hanemann, Loomis, and Kanninen.  The qualitative dependent variable 
model results showed that for all cases except for LEGCR, the coefficients on BIDVAL are 
larger for the pooled data results than those from the probit adoption regressions wi
current users excluded (table 3).  Additional information on the methods used and th
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Table 1. Descriptions of the Farm Management Practices. 
Integrated Pest Management (IPM) - Pest control strategy based on the determination of 
e level at 
which control measures are necessary to prevent a decline in net returns.  This can include 
scouting, biological controls and cultural controls.  Current WQIP incentive payment does 
not exceed $12 per acre for this practice.  
Legume Crediting (LEGSR) - Nutrient management practice involving the estimation of 
the amount of nitrogen available for crops from previous legumes (e.g., alfalfa, clover, 
cover crops, etc.) and reducing the application rate of commercial fertilizers accordingly.  
WQIP incentive payment does not exceed $10 per acre.   
Manure Testing (MANTST) - Nutrient management practice which accounts for the 
amount of nutrients available for crops from applying livestock or poultry manure and 
reducing the application rate of commercial fertilizer accordingly.  Current WQIP 
incentive payment does not exceed $10 per acre for this practice.  
Split Applications of Nitrogen (SPHN) - Nutrient management practice whereby 
one-half or less of the required amount of nitrogen for crop production is applied at or 
before planting, with the remainder applied after emergence, in order to supply nutrients 
more evenly and at times when the crop can most efficiently use them.  Current WQIP 
incentive payment does not exceed $10 per acre for this practice.  
Soil Moisture Testing (SMTST) - Irrigation water management practice in which  
tensiometers or water table monitoring wells are used to estimate the amount of water 
available from subsurface sources.  WQIP payment does not exceed $10 per acre.  
an economic threshold that indicates when a pest population is approaching th
 
 
 
tandard Deviation).Table 2. Definitions of the Explanatory Variables (Mean/S  
nce (25.0/13.2). 
8). 
. 
). 
BIDVAL - Bid Offer ($) in the WTA question (9.44/6.16). 
TACRE - Total acres operated (1053/1457). 
EDUC - Formal education of operator, by category (3.11/1.40). 
FLVALUE - Estimated market value per acre of land ($1321/$742). 
EXPER - Farm operator's years of experie
BPWORK - Number of days annually operator worked off the farm (45.3/88.3). 
NETINC - Operation's Net farm income in 1991 ($27426/$20840). 
SNT - Soil nitrogen test performed in 1992 (dummy)(0.16/0.37). 
TISTST - Tissue test performed in 1992 (dummy)(0.04/0.1
PESTM - Destroy crop residues for host free zones (dummy)(0.189/0.39). 
ANIMAL - Farm type-beef,hogs,sheep (dummy)(0.20/0.40). 
ROTATE - Grasses and legumes in rotation (dummy)(0.05/0.22). 
MANURE - Manure applied to field (dummy)(0.13/0.33). 
IA - Sample located in the Eastern Iowa or Illinois Basin Area (dummy)(0.56/0.48)
ALBR - Sample located in the Albermarle-Pamlico Drainage Area (dummy)(0.20/0.39
IDAHO - Sample located in the Upper Snake River Basin Area (dummy)(0.15/0.36). 
